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ANDREI PIPPIDI
AFTERTHOUGHTS OF ANOTHER ORTHODOX HISTORIAN 
ON THE SAME SUBJECT
It’s a sad story that Pofessor Pavlowitch is telling us. He does it without any 
prejudice, with a lucid detachment which is rare nowadays, especially when this 
kind of objectivity is not flawed by skepticism. Let me try to add a few 
unsystematic remarks resulting from a parallel experience and confirming the 
pattern thus drawn.
It is generally acknowledged that in South-Eastern Europe the relationship 
between the Church and the state was influenced by two precedents. The first, 
remote as it is, but still very present through the ritual and the mental 
background, is the symphonia (agreement) which united the interests of emperor 
and patriarch - an interpenetration which so distributed the authority that neither 
was political life immune from religion, nor were ecclesiastical affairs 
autonomous. The second stage came after the fall of Constantinople, when the 
millet system of self-government under religious leaders was created and later 
extended from the Greeks, Slavs and Romanians, who formed together the group 
of Orthodox Christians, to the Armenians, the Jews and other major non-Muslim 
minorités. The allegation that a separation of the Church from the state was then 
achieved can be supported by historical evidence, but only in a sense which was 
revived five centuries later during the period of Communist rule. This means 
control and tutelage exerted by rulers who were in fact the ideological enemy, 
though it almost never was declared as an overt conflict.
The only exception to this situation were the twin principalities of Wallachia
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and Moldavia, that were granted autonomy and where the Byzantine model was 
preserved. Under the nominal authority of the patriarch of Constantinople, who 
had become a prisoner of the Turks, the two Romanian Churches recognized as 
their protector and censor an Orthodox prince who was himself obeying to the 
sultan. In this case, the religious life of the Romanians was not harrassed by the 
same constraints which challenged the Balkan Christians, and they even 
supported the Christian East through generous donations to many sanctuaries 
(Mt. Athos, Jerusalem, Sinai etc.) and through the printing of religious books (in 
Church Slavonic and later in Greek).
They also resisted several attempts to convert them to Catholicism (or, some 
other times, to Protestantism). This stubborn defence of their Orthodoxy even 
estranged them for a while from that Latin culture which would have brought 
them into line with the other nations speaking a Romance language, but which 
they rejected as an instrument of the Western missionaries who threatened their 
traditional identity. In the third of the Romanian provinces, Transylvania, 
Orthodoxy was never one of the official confessions, but only tolerated; an 
inferior status corresponding to the social discrimination against the Romanians 
in that Hungarian-ruled principality.
Henceforth, it can be said that in South-Eastern Europe religion was a barrier 
against assimilation (in the Balkan peninsula, it helped to keep alive amidst the 
Christians the memories of their past independence in the same way that it acted 
everywhere for the Jews). On the other hand, one must remember that the Church 
was hostile to a secular current like nationalism - a case which has been 
abundantly argued with Greek examples. And it is true that the advent of 
nationalism had a disruptive impact on the common bond which had, until then, 
associated the Orthodox Christians. A proof can be found in the aggressive 
policy of the Serbian Church in the Banat, where the Illyric nation had asked for 
supremacy in «dogmaticis et pure spiritualibus», a request granted by the 
imperial government in 1779, though the Romanian population of that region 
was twice more numerous.
Professor Pavlowitch is right to suggest that the Russian model, though it lured 
the Balkan Christians through its neo-Byzantine pageantry and through the hope 
of freedom that it offered, contributed to enroll the Church in the service of state. 
The Lutheran influence, deeply rooted, of course, in the Petrine reforms, was also 
introduced into King Otto’s Greece. The secularization of ecclesiastical lands 
began by a measure of the Greek government and was imitated, thirty years later, 
by Alexander Cuza, the first ruler of the United Romanian Principalitites, causing
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considerable anger in the Greek clergy who benefited from those estates (question 
of the dedicated monasteries [μετόχια], 1863). It was then that a law forbade the 
use in church of other languages than Romanian, the final term of a process which 
had started in the 17th century with the translation of liturgical books.
Balkan disunity produced national Churches, but this enterprise had not been 
initiated by the clergy: it was coming from politicians, who in most cases were 
anti-clerical or belonged to the freemasonry. It was quite obvious in the case of 
the Bulgarians, who in the space of only one generation had progressed from the 
reading of Fénelon to the more modem ideas of Darwin. In 1831 the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate recognized the autonomy of the Serbian Church and in 1870 the 
Bulgarians obtained a firman from the sultan establishing a Church independent 
from Constantinople.
For the Romanians, the process was a more complex one. In Transylvania, 
since 1700, the Romanian population was religiously divided in two: Orthodox 
and Greek Catholic. Uniatism was encouraged by the Habsburgs who had 
recently acquired the province and who felt it necessary to create a rival pole of 
attraction in front of the Orthodox whose loyalty to the Wallachian Church, 
across the Carpathians, made them suspect from the political point of view. 
During the 18th century, the Romanian intelligentsia developed a local cultural 
style which was characteristic for the Uniate circles: at its core was the discovery 
of Latin origins, a scholarly argument for claiming equality of status with the 
other four accepted (privileged) denominations: Roman Catholicism, 
Lutheranism, Calvinism, Unitarianism. The Orthodox Church of Transylvania 
lagged behind in an inferior position until the Toleration edict of Joseph II 
(1781). Meanwhile, in the Romanian provinces left under Turkish domination 
and expecting their liberation, planning even their future as satellite countries in 
the shadow of the Third Rome, the Phanariot princes confined the Church to the 
administration of schools and charitable institutions. Its large endowments were 
increasingly exploited by Greek monks and Cuza’s reform took away these 
resources which might have been employed for social assistance. With the 
Western model of modernity spreading, this laicization from above was already 
starting to dissolve the traditional framework of daily life. This fracture deprived 
Romanian society of most of its medieval heritage. By the 20th century, the 
Orthodox Church, unable to inspire or to control the masses any more, was 
backward-looking, yet careful to pay Caesar’s due.
In the new Romania, much expanded in population and territory after the 
First World War, opposition between the Uniate and Orthodox Churches played
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a large role. The growth of Romanian nationalism had to conciliate the two 
divergent traditions, each of them embodying a different cultural identity, 
Mitteleuropäisch and Balkan. Miron Christea, the Transylvanian prelate who 
was elected as the first patriarch of the autocephalous Church of Romania, was 
a steadfast Orthodox. The diary of his close friend, the poet and chauvinist 
politician Octavian Goga, as well as his own secret memoirs which have been 
published only last year, show the Patriarch’s mundane and ambitious sides. He 
assumed the high office of heading the three-men regency that ruled the country 
in the name of young King Michael and in 1938-1939, under the personal 
dictatorship of King Carol II, he accepted to be a decorative Prime Minister, 
endorsing the suppression of political parties. In such conditions, it’s hardly 
surprising that he introduced into the constitution the provision that the 
Orthodox Church is dominant in Romania. National was then an attribute still 
shared by the Orthodox with the Greek Catholics. Through the writings of such 
thinkers as Nichiphor Crainic, Simion Mehedinti and Nae Ionescu, all of them 
German-educated, a radical national ideology was elaborated linking Romanian 
national character with Orthodoxy. Crainic provided the theory of auto­
chthonous state for the antisemitic leanings of the royal dictatorship, and Ionescu 
went as far as denying the Romanianness of the Uniates, not to speak about the 
Jews, who were unredeemably fated to suffer for the sin of Judas.
I cannot present here a report on the religious situation in Romania under the 
Communist regimes (there were two of them: the Soviet-type rule, followed by 
the extreme nationalistic version which collapsed in 1989). An effort should be 
made to collect data and to determine the effects of these two dictatorships on 
religious life.
The Greek Catholic Church was suppressed in 1948, under the pretext of 
restoring the unity of the nation: the members of the Uniate clergy either adhered 
to Roman Catholicism, or went undergound. Their bishops died in prison or were 
released only in extremis. Whole villages deprived of their priests were unable 
to resist and were absorbed by the Orthodox majority. Therefore, since 1990 it 
has proved difficult to revive the Uniate Church, now reduced to 1 % of the total 
population. Repression ravaged also the ranks of the Orthodox clergy: 
interdictions to officiate, imprisonments, while many monks and nuns were 
forcibly sent to resume lay life. For about forty years people were not allowed to 
practice their religion outside the control of the state. Atheism was taught in 
schools and universities, or even through the ideological indoctrination of adult 
employees, while religious instruction was hindered. Clergy were required to
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swear oaths of loyalty or to make official declarations in support of the Party.
This subservient position of the Church was taken as target of many 
criticisms after 1990, as was the intolerant attitude opposed to the attempts to 
restore Uniatism. Officially, the Greek Catholics have been granted their rights, 
but the question of Church properties is still pending in court with various and 
always protracted results. A curious episode of this conflict was highlighted by 
Katherine Verdery, in her book The Political Life of Dead Bodies (Columbia 
University Press, 1999), where the American anthropologist describes the 1997 
reburial of Bishop Inochentie Micu in his natal Transylvania after an exile of two 
centuries. In former Bessarabia, which has obtained independence under the 
name of Moldova, the Orthodox Church is split up by a schism of political origin, 
between Moscow and Bucharest, the rival centres of influence in the region.
To the loss of prestige and credibility, the Orthodox Church is reacting in 
several ways. Its strong opposition to the evangelistic movements and the 
distrust manifested to the Catholic Church are not merely reflexes of 
conservatism, but they mean to make clear that the Orthodox Patriarchate claims 
the position of an arbiter in specifically religious problems, as well as in politics. 
The debate over the title of National Church has shown who is becoming the 
defender of national identity. The governments of the early 1990s, being in a 
crisis of legitimacy, played the card of the Orthodox hierarchy and ostentatiously 
adopted ecclesiastical rituals whenever they wanted to impress the masses, an 
attitude which was wholeheartedly carried on by their Christian-Democrat 
successors. Plans of bulding a new Cathedral, of a huge size, in Bucharest, and 
another in Cluj, where it is clearly intended to show up in front of the religious 
and ethnic rivals, are concomitant with the canonization of thirteen new saints, 
a patriotic strategy which had been arleady implemented after the 1948 
unification of Churches. A great number of Orthodox monasteries are being 
founded throughout the country, sometimes on the ruins of old religious 
settlements.
The visit of Pope John Paul II to Bucharest, which had been for quite a long 
time the object of diplomatic negotiations, was not the occasion of a historic 
Orthodox-Catholic reconciliation, but strengthened the position of Patriarch 
Teoctist as a partner of the Romanian government. However, some voices in the 
Orthodox hierarchy have outspokenly expressed their concern about the present 
administration, as too lenient and too open to the West. The warning that the 
votes of the clergy and of their rural flock might help to bring the opposition into 
power certainly sounded alarming to the ears of Romania’s political leaders.
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No competition with other Churches represents a real difficulty for the 
Orthodox community which, after all, constitutes the overwhelming majority 
(86% of the total population). The real problem is to find the delicate balance 
between a reasonable and sincere respect for tradition and a Christian modesty 
which should make us ready to learn from alien wisdom. As longs as village boys 
will go to seminary to become priests -as they used, before 1989, to vest a 
policeman’s uniform to escape poverty- we shall not have that educated and 
dignified clergy that is an indispensable condition to the straightening of 
Romanian Orthodoxy. A Church confiscated by nationalism and under­
evaluating its social duties, this is, I’m afraid, what indicates the converging 
surveys at the present turning point. And finding myself in full agreement with 
Professor Pavlowitch is not enough of a consolation.
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